Today's Chicago Tribune: Cheney approved the shooting down of United Flight 93 on 9/11
Chicagotribune.com
The next vice president
May 12, 2008
On the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, after planes had crashed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Vice President Dick Cheney was in the White House bunker and had to make a momentous recommendation to President Bush, who was in flight aboard Air Force One: that Bush authorize the military to shoot down any civilian airliners that might be hijacked and headed for other targets.
Bush concurred—and shortly after, the moment of truth arrived. A military aide approached Cheney: "There is a plane 80 miles out," he said. "There is a fighter in the area. Should we engage?" Cheney had thought through the complex implications of that question, had discussed it with his boss, and didn't hesitate to answer: "Yes." That plane was United Flight 93, which crashed in Pennsylvania before fighter jets could reach it.
On most days, the job of the vice president of the United States is not, on its face, critically important. Aside from breaking tie votes in the Senate, a rare occurrence, the job is often one of sitting in meetings, cutting ribbons and attending funerals.
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The next vice president
May 12, 2008
On the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, after planes had crashed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Vice President Dick Cheney was in the White House bunker and had to make a momentous recommendation to President Bush, who was in flight aboard Air Force One: that Bush authorize the military to shoot down any civilian airliners that might be hijacked and headed for other targets.
Bush concurred—and shortly after, the moment of truth arrived. A military aide approached Cheney: "There is a plane 80 miles out," he said. "There is a fighter in the area. Should we engage?" Cheney had thought through the complex implications of that question, had discussed it with his boss, and didn't hesitate to answer: "Yes." That plane was United Flight 93, which crashed in Pennsylvania before fighter jets could reach it.
On most days, the job of the vice president of the United States is not, on its face, critically important. Aside from breaking tie votes in the Senate, a rare occurrence, the job is often one of sitting in meetings, cutting ribbons and attending funerals.
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What story do they want to go with? That Bush was in touch with Cheney and gave the order to shoot down any straying jets or that Air Force One had lost communications?
From the CBC
Inside the presidential limousine, there was more chaos. The President was trying to speak to his staff at the White House but all the secure telephone lines were down. The communications system overloaded. Mr. Bush was reduced to trying to contact Washington on a borrowed cell phone but even that didn't work. "The President said to us, you know I could not, for awhile the communication from the White House broke down and I couldn't reach them and they couldn't reach me. That was scary on both sides because the President is the only one who can give certain orders that need to be given," says Kean, chair of the 9/11 Commission.
Mr. Bush expected the communications problem to be solved when he boarded Air Force One in Florida at 9:45 am but the phones there worked only sporadically. Kean recalls, "In the case of any kind of attack in the United States, what you're supposed to do is get the President off the ground, and Air Force One then becomes the command centre. And the President is then safe and is commanding the forces of the United States from the air. The communications didn't work."
The President's Senior Advisor Karen Hughes, was trying to call him through the White House switchboard. "The operator came back and I remember his voice was kind of shaky and he said - 'Ma'am we cannot reach Air Force One.' And that was a very, very, frightening moment because, of course, I never had that happen before."
And what about this inconvenient truth?
From Cooperative Research.org
According to the 9/11 Commission, Vice President Dick Cheney is told that the Air Force is trying to establish a combat air patrol (CAP) over Washington. Cheney, who is in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House, then calls President Bush on Air Force One to discuss the rules of engagement for this CAP. Cheney later tells the 9/11 Commission that he’d felt “it did no good to establish the CAP unless the pilots had instructions on whether they were authorized to shoot if the plane would not divert.” He recalls that “the president signed off on that concept.” Bush will recall this phone call and emphasize to the 9/11 Commission that, during it, he had authorized the shootdown of hijacked aircraft. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, who is in the PEOC with Cheney, will tell the Commission she recalls hearing Cheney inform the president: “Sir, the CAPs are up. Sir, they’re going to want to know what to do.” Then she hears Cheney say, “Yes sir.” However, as the Commission notes: “Among the sources that reflect other important events that morning there is no documentary evidence for this call, although the relevant sources are incomplete. Others nearby who were taking notes, such as the vice president’s chief of staff, [I. Lewis “Scooter”] Libby, who sat next to him, and [Lynne] Cheney, did not note a call between the president and vice president immediately after the vice president entered the conference room.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 40-41] Commenting on this alleged call, Commission Chairman Thomas Kean will say, “The phone logs don’t exist, because they evidently got so fouled up in communications that the phone logs have nothing.” Commission Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton adds: “There’s no documentary evidence here. And the only evidence you have is the statement of the president and the vice president, which was that the president gave the order to shoot down.” [9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, 6/18/2004] Newsweek will report that it “has learned that some on the Commission staff were, in fact, highly skeptical of the vice president’s account and made their views clearer in an earlier draft of their staff report. According to one knowledgeable source, some staffers ‘flat out didn’t believe the call ever took place.’” According to a 9/11 Commission staffer, the Commission’s report will be “watered down” on this issue, after vigorous lobbying from the White House. [NEWSWEEK, 6/20/2004] Cheney phones Bush again at 10:18 (see 10:18 a.m.-10:20 a.m. September 11, 2001). According to the 9/11 Commission, it is in fact during that call that Bush authorizes the military to shoot down threatening aircraft. [9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 41]